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Abstract 
The paper presents an analysis of a number of cognitive metaphors pertaining to the 
concept of mind (e.g. sanity and insanity), heart, and fire. The study has been based on the 
text of Canterbury Tales by Geoffrey Chaucer. The paper contains a short theoretical 
introduction and a discussion of different linguistic and psychological approaches to 
issues related to figurative and literal, conventional language use. The analytical part 
focuses on the detailed contextual study of the cognitive metaphorical concepts. It is 
argued that many apparently similar concepts can evoke semantically conflicting 
metaphors, while concepts that appear to be mutually exclusive can sometimes evoke 
common associations and thereby similar metaphors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present paper is to analyse varieties of figurative expressions within the 
concept of the mind in The Canterbury Tales. The paper explores varieties of contexts 
from Middle English and analyses them in the light of contemporary theories of 
metaphors and metonymies. The theoretical part deals with contemporary theories on 
metaphor and metonymy continuum represented by Barcelona (2000), Radden (2000), 
Cruse (2004) among others, and with the theory of objectification (Szwedek 2007). The 
aim of the analytical part is to focus on the detailed contextual study of the metaphors 
linked with the concept of the mind and to view it in close relation with the theories on 
metaphor and metonymy continuum. Moreover, the analysis will show which metaphors 
in the corpus are culture-specific and which are more universal. 
The analysis is based on all texts of Caxton’s edition of The Canterbury Tales: The 
British Library Copies (ed. by Barbara Bordalejo), available as a CD-Rom containing the 
first full-colour facsimiles of all copies of Willliam Caxton’s first and second editions of 
Geoffrey Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales. It is also the first-ever electronic publication 
of the full text of the Caxton editions. 
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2. Theoretical prerequisites 
 
Following the traditional approach, metaphor involves mapping of more tangible, 
concrete phenomena (a source domain) upon abstract ones (a target domain) across 
different conceptual domains, while metonymy involves mapping of a source onto a 
target within one and the same conceptual domain. The traditional approach implies that 
metaphor and metonymy involve two distinct processes, the first one being based on 
similarity and the other on congruity. From that perspective, one can put a relatively 
clear-cut line between the metaphorical and metonymic processes.  
 It should be emphasised that the overall approach to the concepts of metaphor/ 
metonymy and their coreferentiality has changed with the publications of such linguists 
as Traugott (1989), Barcelona (2000), Radden (2000) and Cruse (2004). For instance, 
Radden, in his approach to metaphor and metonymy suggests that they cannot be 
conceived as discrete entities: 
 
The traditional distinction between metaphor and metonymy can no longer be maintained. 
The classical notions of metaphor and metonymy are to be seen as prototypical categories 
at the end points of a continuum of mapping processes. The range in the middle of the 
metonymy-metaphor continuum is made up of metonymy-based metaphors, which also 
account for the transition of metonymy to metaphor by providing an experiential 
motivation of a metaphor (Radden 2000: 105). 
 
One of the crucial points the newer cognitive approach highlights is that the distinction 
between metaphor and metonymy is scalar rather than discrete (cf. also Barcelona 
2000:16). According to this new perspective, not only metaphor and metonymy need not 
be viewed as two opposite processes, but metaphor can be motivated metonymically 
thereby giving rise to metaphor based on metonymy. In other words, metonymy is a 
conceptual prerequisite for metaphor. Barcelona (2000) further illustrates this 
assumption claiming that motivation is not necessarily tied up with a sequential ordering 
of the mapping and that the mapping may even be simultaneous. Namely, the metonymic 
understanding of the source or target domain in a metaphor need not have become 
conventionalised prior to the conventionalisation of the metaphor. One example of 
metonymy-based metaphor, discussed by Barcelona, is the metonymic motivation of 
most metaphors for emotions (anger, happiness, sadness, love , and pride) on the basis of 
physiological or behavioural responses to emotions. For instance, a physiological effect 
of emotion that is often metonymised is the Affected Heart Rate, (the heart rate, which is 
believed to change as a result of a strong emotional impact stands for emotion), as in his 
heart rate stopped when he saw her. In other words, metaphor does not really develop 
‘out of’ the metonymy but is motivated and constrained by the metonymic model of the 
target. Such an approach casts a different light upon both metaphor and metonymy and 
the relation between them. This new perspective on metaphor-metonymy continuum is 
applied in the present paper in the analysis of The Canterbury Tales expressions linked 
with the concept of the mind.   
 With regard to the theory of objectification, Szwedek (2007) emphasises that all non-
physical phenomena have to be conceptualised as physical objects before they can be 
assigned structure and orientation. By having no shape on their own, they are treated as 
objects and inherit all the properties of an object. Szwedek explains that objectification is 
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the basis for all conceptualisation, as it is only the physical world that is directly 
accessible to our senses. The paper will attempt to show that the metaphor of 
objectification is a basis for the conceptualisation of wisdom and that different types of 
objects are involved in the conceptualisation of wisdom.  
 
 
3. The analysis of the concept of the mind 
 
The analysis of the concept of the mind requires an examination of various collocations 
from the conceptual point of view. The aim of the present section is to provide a three-
fold division within the concept of the mind and analyse the expressions that refer to the 
following components: high intellectual capacity, low intellectual capacity and madness. 
Moreover, the study will show that wisdom was highly objectified, which makes these 
metaphors more universal rather than culture-specific.  
 
 
3.1 High intellectual capacity 
 
The metaphors linked to the high intellectual capacity can be noticed in the following 
phrases: 
(1) ful of sapience ‘full of wisdom’ 
(2) haue sapience ‘have wisdom’ 
(3) gret light of sapience ‘great light of wisdom’ 
(4) fulfilled of sapience ‘filled with wisdom’ 
(5) thoughtful ‘thoughtful’ 
(6) high prudence ‘high prudence’ 
(7) my wit is greet ‘my wit is great’ 
(8) ouercome be reson ‘overcome by reason’ 
(9) assay greet sapience ‘test great wisdom’ 
(10) need of sapience ‘need of wisdom’ 
(11) wit yeue ‘give wit’ 
     
 
3.1.1 Wisdom and the container metaphor  
 
Wisdom can be conceptualised as contents within a container, which can be observed is 
phrases (1, 4, 5, and 6 above ). In these contexts, the whole self functions as a container 
for thoughts, thus creating the metaphor THE SELF IS A CONTAINER FOR 
THOUGHTS. The amount of the substance in the container is indicative of the person’s 
intelligence and erudition. In other words, the container has to be full for if the person is 
to be considered wise and perceptive. Moreover, contexts of phrases (1, 4, 5, and 6) are 
also conceptualised along orientational metaphors MORE IS UP and REASON IS UP 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980) where the more thoughts are placed in the container, the 
wiser the person is. 
 In the analysis of the container metaphor, two elements full and high can also be 
compared. In both, the container serves as an element enabling visualisation of wisdom. 
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Metaphorically speaking, one can say that by putting many thoughts into the container, 
they will reach a higher level inside the container. Nevertheless, full marks two entities, 
the container as well as the content inside it. It gives information that there is a large 
amount of content, which is, however, externally bounded. The adjective high, however, 
is devoid of this information. High refers, first of all, to the container and describes its 
physical appearance. Only later this adjective is mapped on the more abstract level, 
where it indicates the level of wisdom. Thus high, from the purely physical description 
of the container, proceeds to stand for the description of the content itself, thereby giving 
rise to metonymy.  
 The context of (7) is also linked with the container metaphor, yet in this example, the 
wit corresponds to the container. Thus, the wit is conceptualised as great when it houses 
a large amount of thoughts. The analysis of the contexts, illustrated so far, shows that 
two types of containers are linked with wisdom, namely the self is a container for 
thoughts, as well as the wit is a container for thoughts. The conceptualisation of the self 
as the container for wisdom makes the instances metaphorical, while the projection of 
the wit as the container gives rise to metaphors based on metonymy, where a part stands 
for the whole. In other words, the part (here: great wit) stands for the whole person 
perceived as wise and erudite.  
 
 
3.1.2 Wisdom and the concept of light  
 
Wisdom can also be conceptualised via the concept of light, which can be exemplified 
by context (3). The example corresponds to the metaphor linked with light – IDEAS 
ARE LIGHT SOURCES (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). It seems that the two metaphors 
connected with wisdom, the container and the light metaphors, can be juxtaposed and 
differentiated. The container metaphor highlights the effect of absorbing knowledge, 
thus the variety of thoughts in the container. The intelligent and wise person is the one 
that knows a lot on many topics; the person that has collected multiplicity of 
information. In other words, the container metaphor focuses on what the person already 
knows; what he or she has in his/her mind. However, the light metaphor does not 
highlight the effect of gathering knowledge, but rather concentrates on the process of 
obtaining knowledge. Light makes us see. It penetrates everywhere and enlightens every 
dark and murky region casting a different perspective on it. An intelligent person is the 
one that does not see only one perspective or one dimension but a variety of aspects 
related to the topic. It is the person that is eager to penetrate through unknown areas and 
discuss difficult topics casting a different light or perspective on them. The light 
metaphor highlights the aspect of penetration, seeing many dimensions, and unveiling 
the mysterious, the unknown or taboo topics thereby structuring the process of gaining 
knowledge. One can even proceed further and claim that the expression greet light of 
sapience illustrates wisdom as a kind of light. Wisdom, hence, can be perceived as 
equipped with metaphorical light that emanates outward. Approaching these examples, 
light is a kind of instrument that enables to draw the value of wisdom. In other words, 
the source domain of light is used to conceptualise wisdom as a value in itself. Equipped 
with such attributes as uniqueness, goodness and eminence, the domain of light raises 
the value of wisdom, which becomes conceived as unique, eminent and ennobling. In 
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other words, the element of light makes the person be perceived not only as wise, but 
also as noble. The two elements, namely wisdom and nobility, are blended in the 
WISDOM IS LIGHT metaphor. What takes place is the process of the transferring the 
attributes of light upon the target domain of wisdom which becomes linked with light, 
evokes highly positive undertones. Although the metaphorical correlation between 
wisdom and light is widely accepted in present-day English, wisdom itself seems to 
receive different connotations when compared with data from the corpus. In other words, 
PDE expressions such as “bright person” or “clear ideas” are neutral with respect to 
morality. Hence, they only refer to intelligence and do not imply any other undertones. 
In The Canterbury Tales, however, wisdom, similar to light, was evidently viewed as 
ennobling, unique and eminent. In other words, it contained the element of nobility in its 
conceptual framework. 
 
 
3.1.3 Wisdom as a commodity 
 
Middle English (ME) nouns denoting knowledge could co-occur in collocation with 
other verbs, such as have, govern, trust, overcome, test and prove, which can be seen in 
contexts (2, 8, 9, 10, and 11). Within the commodity metaphor, wisdom can be viewed 
as a valuable object, a weapon or a product. 
 In (2), wisdom is conceptualised as an object. A person has wisdom just like he or 
she could have any commodity, yet this commodity is perceived as something valuable. 
The context can bring to mind the metaphor WISDOM IS A VALUABLE OBJECT. 
The same metaphor is recorded in context (11), in which wit can be given. Here, wit can 
be viewed as a container, which is like a treasure that can change one’s life completely.  
 In (8), wisdom is conceptualised via the metaphor REASON IS WEAPON, which 
can be seen in the following context: 
 
And your wyf restrayne that wicked purpose 
And ouercome you be reson and by good counceyll (The Tale of Melibee 124). 
(And your wife will restrain that wicked purpose  
And will overcome you by reason and by a good council). 
 
Reason, then, is highly valued. The person, by thinking logically, can overcome the 
others. In (9) and (10), wisdom is conceptualised as a product: 
 
Be cause of thy swete wordes and eke for I have 
Assaied thy grete sapience and thy grete trouthe 
I will gouern me by thy council in alle manner thing (The Tale of Melibee 146). 
(Due to your sweet words and, moreover, for I have tested your great wisdom and your 
great truth I will be directed by your council in all kinds of things).   
If ony of yow have nede of sapience (The Tale of Malibee 151)   
(If any of you have need of sapience). 
 
In these contexts, wisdom can be tested just like any other product, or it may be felt to be 
needed. 
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3.2 Low intellectual capacity 
 
The metaphors linked to low intellectual capacity can be represented by the following 
expressions: 
(12) rude wit ‘rude wit’ 
(13) thynne wit ‘thin wit’ 
(14) ful blynd conceit ‘full blind conceit’ 
(15) wit suffices ‘wit is sufficient’ 
(16) where was thy wit? ‘where is your wit’ 
(17) short wit ‘short wit’ 
 
 
3.2.1 Low intellectual capacity preceded by adjectives centrally referring to a 
person 
 
In (12) and (14) wit is conceptualised as a person. Hence, they are personified or viewed 
as animate objects. In these contexts the adjectives rude and blind require some analysis 
as they have a different meaning when related to mind than when referring to a person. 
Hence, rude wit does not correspond to a rude person, whereas blind conceit does not 
stand for a blind person. These adjectives have been further metaphorised. Rude person 
denotes someone who speaks or behaves in a way that is not polite or is likely to offend 
or annoy people, while the expression rude wit is used to imply that the person is 
uneducated and ignorant. Nevertheless, the common platform of references can be found 
for the two collocations. Both expressions refer to some common norms which, 
however, have been violated. In the former phrase (rude person), the person does not 
abide by the generally accepted canon of behaviour, while in the latter phrase (rude wit), 
the person does not conform to the generally accepted canon of knowledge. Both 
manners are perceived as annoying. Furthermore, in the two expressions, the person 
chooses this way of conduct purposefully. In other words, he or she deliberately does not 
submit to the imposed rules existing in the society, either by rejecting received norms of 
behaviour, or by a denial of the generally accepted canon of knowledge. Additionally, in 
both expressions rude has evaluating, pejorative undertones.  
 A similar analysis can be carried out in case of blind. Blind in the expression blind 
person denotes someone who is physically handicapped and cannot see. Blind in blind 
conceit implies a person that is unenlightened and ignorant. Yet, as in the formerly 
analysed expression, a common platform of references can be found. To begin with, the 
person who has seen a lot, knows a lot. The process of knowing is thereby linked with 
seeing. Moreover, a wise person, just like light, is willing to penetrate everything and to 
mentally embrace as much as possible, which is within his or her field of vision. He or 
she is characterised by curiosity and inquisitiveness. Thus, the expression blind conceit 
implies that the person is unwilling to see. Being unwilling may entail the hypothesis 
that the person will not see and thus will remain blind and unaware of everything that is 
happening around. This perseverance not to see can be associated with indifference and 
lack of interest. The modification of blind with full further reinforces the passive attitude 
to knowledge. Hence, while the collocation blind person is linked with being physically 
handicapped, the phrase blind conceit is connected with being mentally handicapped. 
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Blind person is thus a literal statement as the adjective blind encodes the basic, root 
sense. Nevertheless, blind conceit is a metaphorical expression in which blind denotes 
the epistemic, subjective sense. The expressions related to wit are also instances of 
metaphors based on metonymies (part for the whole), yet the adjectives should be also 
additionally perceived as equipped with metaphorical undertones.  
 
 
3.2.2 Low intellectual ability preceded by adjectives centrally referring to humans 
and objects 
 
The lexemes that pertained to mind, could also be modified by the adjectives that 
centrally referred both to humans and objects (e.g., thin wit, short wit). As for thin, the 
following central senses can be distinguished. When referred to objects, thin denotes a 
very small distance between two sides or two flat surfaces. Thin can also be linked with 
a person to point to someone that has little fat on his or her body. In both, the concept of 
a small amount is imprinted. A thin book is the one that contains few pages, while a thin 
person is someone that is slim hence there is little fat on his or her body. As for thin wit, 
it can be conceptualised as a long passage in which there are just few thoughts. Thus the 
adjective thin affects a different conceptualisation of wit. The image of wit that appears 
in the mind is not the one of a container but rather of a passage due to the modifying 
adjective. In the analysed expressions, this passage is projected as containing hardly any 
thoughts. Furthermore, the adjective thin, by evoking the mental content of the mind, is 
metaphorical as opposed to thin in “thin book” or “thin person”, where it refers to the 
physical appearance of the described entities. 
 It should be emphasised, however, that thin, in the collocation with wit seems to be 
metaphorical to a lesser extent than blind and rude in the collocations with conceit and 
wit respectively. Blind and rude when used in collocation with the mind require a 
different meaning, or at least a highly motivated interpretation of the meaning that 
centrally refers to the physical appearance of a person. The semantics of thin collocating 
with book, person, or wit is roughly similar. It just needs to be slightly modified when 
applied to wit. In other words, the images of the book, person, or wit, when preceded by 
thin are similar in the sense that these entities appear to be of a certain length, yet they 
contain a small amount or number of something, namely of pages (book), fat (person) or 
thoughts (wit). As already noted, the number of pages or the amount of fat refers to the 
physical description of a book or a person, respectively. However, the number of 
thoughts is linked with the mental content of the wit, which, in turn, is connected with 
the metaphorisation of the adjective thin. 
 Wit could also be modified by the adjective short. The similar line of analysis can be 
observed both in short as in thin when juxtaposed with the wit. Short, like thin, occurs in 
collocations with the person as well as the object. Short, when referred to objects, 
denotes a small amount in length, e.g., as in “short hair.” Linked with a person, short 
pertains to someone who is of less than average height. Short wit can be conceptualised 
as a short passage in which there are few thoughts due to the limitations of the passage. 
In other words, the passage is so short that it can hold only few thoughts. The 
juxtaposition of thin wit and short wit results in totally different images. In thin wit the 
passage is long but it contains very few thoughts. Additionally, these thoughts may 
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appear as weak or feeble as they are housed in the thin passage. In short wit, the passage 
is so small that it physically cannot hold many thoughts. Furthermore, the adjective short 
in the collocation short wit is similarly metaphorical as thin in thin wit. Thus, the 
meaning of short in short hair, short person and short wit is similar, yet in the first two 
instances short refers to the physical description of the entities, while in the latter 
instance short applies to the mental analysis of the appearance and the content of the wit.  
It should also be emphasised that the collocations linked with a low level of 
intelligence evoke the image of the passage, as opposed to the collocations that pertain to 
a high level of intelligence, which create the image of the container. One should 
emphasise that the attribute of the size is associated with the container image, which in 
turn is conducive to the large number of thoughts that could be housed inside it. On the 
other hand, the passage is also a kind of a container. Yet, by being marked by adjectives 
linked to the size or breadth, it becomes conceptualised as a container that is narrow or 
short. Such metaphors are based on metonymies in which the part stands for the whole.  
 
 
3.2.3 Wit as an enity temporarily absent 
 
Wit could also be conceptualised as an entity that is temporarily absent or exists in small 
amounts. In (16) wit is visualised as the entity temporarily absent, which can be noticed 
in the following context: 
 
Where was thy wit? (The Maniciple’s Tale 178).   
(Where was your wit?). 
 
Wit is viewed here as an entity that was once present but then it disappeared, thereby 
contributing to a chaos.  
 Wit, in (15) is conceived of as an entity present in small amounts, which can be seen 
in the following lines: 
 
Now wolde my wit wolde suffise 
To tellyn al that longith to that art. (The Canon’s Yeoman’s Prologue 162-163). 
(Now I would like my wit would be sufficient enough to tell all that is appropriate to that 
art). 
 
In this context the person is wondering if the possessed brain is big enough to be able to 
express all he wants to express. As in selected examples above, the analysed metaphors 
are based on metonymies, where the part stands for the whole. 
 
 
3.3 Madness  
 
The metaphors linked to madness can be noticed in the following phrases: 
(18) out of mynde (‘out of mind’) 
(19) half out of mynde (‘half out of mind’) 
(20) lese hed (‘lose head’) 
(21) lese wit (‘lose wit’) 
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(22) mynde is goon (‘mind is gone’) 
(23) troubil wit (‘troubled wit’) 
(24) see woodness (‘see madness’) 
(25) mad wit (‘mad wit’) 
 
 
3.3.1 Madness conceptualised as a totally or half absent mind 
 
Madness can be conceptualised as a totally or half absent mind. Mind, as totally absent is 
recorded in contexts (18) and (22), whereas it is half-absent in (19). Mind is commonly 
perceived as that part of humans that is responsible for rational and logical thinking. 
Therefore madness is frequently visualised as either total absence of, generally speaking, 
mind or as mind which exists only in certain fragments. In (18), the person is out of his 
mind. Consequently, mind is outside this person and he or she is separated from his or 
her mind. This context emphasises separation of the mind and the body. Yet this 
sentence does not invalidate the existence of the mind. It only implies that there is no 
connection between the mind and the body. The body does not receive the signals from 
the mind. A similar separation can be noticed in the collocation mynde is goon (“mind is 
gone”). Yet, additionally there is an implication that the mind disappeared somewhere. 
Thus, while in (18) (- out of his mynde-), such lack of connection is highlighted, in (22) 
(-mynde is goon-), both the separation from the body and the subsequent loss are 
highlighted.  
 Moreover, mind can also be viewed as a fragmentary structure. The person may 
appear to be partially separated from his or her mind. In other words, it is only a half or 
some part of the mind that seems to be outside of the human being. Therefore while in 
(18) (- out of his mynde-), no connection exists between the mind and the body, in (19), 
(- half out of mynde- ), the partial connection is maintained.     
 Another possible conceptualisation of madness is via metaphor based on metonymy, 
which can be exemplified by collocations (20) and (21), viz. lese hed and lese wit. The 
metonymy involved here is part for the whole, where the part (- hed and wit -), i.e. 
“head” and “wit” stand for the intellectual side of the human being. Additionally, hed 
and wit are conceptualised as lost objects, thereby giving rise to a metaphor MADNESS 
IS A LOST MIND/WIT/ HEAD. Consequently, mind, wit and hed are objectified. These 
examples are, thus, instances of metaphors that have a metonymic basis. They are 
dependent on the conceptually prior metonymic conceptualisation. In this model, one 
part, namely MIND/ HED or WIT is singled out to refer to the mental state of a person. 
The projection of a complete MIND/HED or WIT creates the image of a sane person. On 
the other hand, absent or half- absent mind gives rise to a person perceived as mad. 
There is thus a strong connection between a lost MIND/HED or WIT and a “gained” 
madness. Consequently, madness can be conceptualised as an absent or half-absent 
MIND/HED or WIT, as it is the direct consequence of MIND/HED or WIT having been 
lost. Madness in (21) is perceived as an outcome of a lost wit, which can be exemplified 
by the following context: 
 
Ye fare lik a man hadde lost his wit (The Wife of Bath’s Tale 1068).   
(You behave like a man who has lost his wit). 
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In other words, wit is responsible for human rational thinking. Yet, possessing wit may 
not be permanent as one can lose wit. 
 
 
3.3.2 Madness conceptualised as a perceivable object 
 
As for the conceptualisation of madness via objects, one should also notice that madness 
can also be visualised as a perceivable object. In other words, madness becomes an 
entity that can be seen. Nevertheless, in (24) it is not madness that one sees but rather 
reactions, ways of behaviour that show that someone is mad: 
 
Yet saw I woodnesse in his rage (The Knight’s Tale 1159). 
(Yet I saw madness in his rage). 
 
 
3.3.3 Madness conceptualised as a troublemaker 
 
Furthermore, wit in (23) could also be viewed as a troublemaker, thereby evoking 
metaphor based on metonymy MADNESS IS A TROUBLE MAKER, which belongs to 
the category of animate objects. This metaphor can be exemplified by the context: 
 
O troubil wit o ire reckless (The Maniciple’s Tale 175). 
(O troublesome wit, o reckless ire). 
 
Hence, madness could be conceptualised via metaphors based on metonymies. The 
analysis shows that the collocations containing the element of wit, mynde and woodness 
are used with reference to madness. 
 Within the collocations centralising wit, the following metaphors based on 
metonymies can be distinguished: MADNESS IS AN ABSENT OR A HALF ABSENT 
MIND (lese wit), MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER (troubil wit) and madness is an 
insane person (mad wit). In the metaphor MADNESS IS AN ABSENT OR A HALF 
ABSENT MIND, the “wit”, viewed as a rational and logical tool is lost. Thus the wit 
possessed by the person was well-functioning but, unfortunately, the person is no longer 
its owner. In the metaphor MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER, wit is viewed as 
possessing some failure. Moreover, wit is here visualised as a separate being that leads 
people astray. 
 As for the collocations including mynde, they also gave rise to metaphors based on 
metonymies due to the fact that mynde also stood for intellectual human side. The 
figurative expressions that contained mynde centralised both total and half-absence of 
the mind. Consequently, the connection between the mind and the body was either lost 
or imperfect. Within the general metaphors that project the total absence of the mind, 
two sub-models can be distinguished. One of them highlights only some separation of 
the mind from the body, but not the loss of the mind (out of mynde). The other one 
emphasises disappearance of the mind (mynde is goon). All these expressions view 
mynde as a logical, rational entity with which, however, the bond was severed.  
With regard to collocations involving woodness, they give rise to pure metaphors. 
Woodness was the term used for mental illness and not a part of a human being. It gave 
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rise to the metaphor MADNESS IS A PERCEIVABLE OBJECT. Following this 
metaphor, madness is then conceptualised as an entity that can be seen.  
  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, the analysis of metaphors of the mind in Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales, 
as viewed in present day’s perspective, led to the following conclusions: 
 To begin with, metaphors of the mind can be divided into universal and culture-
specific. The universal metaphors are the ones which reflect traces of objectification. 
The metaphors which belong to this category are the following ones: 
1. WISDOM IS CONTENTS IN A CONTAINER (contents is a kind of a 
substance, thus an object) 
2. WISDOM IS A COMMODITY 
3. WISDOM IS PRECEDED BY ADJECTIVES THAT CENTRALLY REFER 
TO HUMANS AND/OR OBJECTS (personified entities are animate 
objects) 
4. WIT IS AN ENTITY TEMPORARILY ABSENT 
5. MADNESS IS ABSENT OR HALF ABSENT MIND (the mind, similar to 
objects, can disappear) 
6. MADNESS IS A PERCEIVABLE OBJECT 
7. MADNESS IS A TROUBLEMAKER (animate object) 
 
With regard to culture-specific metaphors, the conceptualisation of wisdom via light 
implies different undertones than in present-day English. When projected by light, 
wisdom contained not only elements of morality and nobility, but was also conceived of 
as unique and eminent. Moreover, the analysis also explored the structure of metaphors 
pertaining to a high level of intelligence, low level of intelligence and madness.  
 Within the collocations pertaining to a high level of intelligence, several 
metaphorical images can be distinguished. First of all, wisdom can be conceptualised as 
contents within the container. It should be emphasised that two types of the container are 
applied in the visualisation of wisdom, namely the self and the wit. The 
conceptualisation of the self as a container for wisdom makes the instances 
metaphorical, while the projection of the wit as a container gives rise to metaphors based 
on metonymies. In such contexts, wit (the part) stands for the whole intellectual side of 
the human being. 
 Moreover, wisdom can also be conceptualised as linked with light, thereby giving 
rise to a metaphor IDEAS ARE LIGHT SOURCES (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The 
light metaphor highlights the effect of acquiring knowledge, not its effects. 
 Furthermore, wisdom is also viewed as a commodity. As for the conceptualisation of 
wisdom as the commodity, one can distinguish between metaphors that show wisdom as 
a valuable object and those which illustrate it as weapon. 
 As for the collocations centralising a low level of intelligence, the following 
metaphors can be distinguished. To begin with, wit can be personified. In such contexts, 
it is modulated by adjectives that centrally refer to humans. Yet, such adjectives refer to 
negative qualities of a person (e.g. rude) or his or her bodily afflictions (e.g. blind).  
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Moreover, wit is also conceptualised as a passage either thin or short. A thin passage is 
both thin and contains few thoughts. The short passage is so small that it houses hardly 
any thoughts. In other words, the collocations that are linked with low intelligence evoke 
the image of a passage, as opposed to the collocations that pertain to a high level of 
intelligence, which create the image of the container.  
Furthermore, low intelligence is linked with the metaphor IDEAS ARE LIGHT 
SOURCES (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In such collocations the adjective blind is used 
to denote feeble-mindedness and a lack of intelligence. 
 In addition, the collocations connected with low intelligence project wit as an entity 
that is temporarily absent or exists in small portions. Such metaphors are contingent on 
the conceptually prior metonymy, where the part stands for the whole. 
 As for madness, the analysis has shown that it could also be conceptualised via 
varieties of metaphors based on metonymies. The collocations that refer to madness 
often contain such lexemes as wit, mynde and madness. Madness appears to be 
visualised metaphorically as the consequence of the loss of rational, logical tool (wit) or 
in terms of partial or whole separation of the mind from the body. 
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